South Sudan, Republic of vs Togo: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- South Sudan, Republic of
- Togo
How they compare
South Sudan, Republic of currently reports 0.5 DB15-20 methodology against 0.5 DB15-20 methodology in Togo, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Togo has been ahead every year.
South Sudan, Republic of ranks 88th and Togo ranks 88th of 190 countries.
Togo has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | South Sudan, Republic of | Togo | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 0.5 DB15-20 methodology | 0.5 DB15-20 methodology | Togo |
| 2010s | 0.4 DB15-20 methodology | 0.5 DB15-20 methodology | 0.1 DB15-20 methodology | Togo |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), South Sudan, Republic of or Togo?
- South Sudan, Republic of, at 0.5 DB15-20 methodology against 0.5 DB15-20 methodology in Togo as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between South Sudan, Republic of and Togo?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with South Sudan, Republic of ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for South Sudan, Republic of and Togo?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do South Sudan, Republic of and Togo rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- South Sudan, Republic of ranks 88th and Togo ranks 88th of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.