Bhutan vs Tonga: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)

Bhutan
0 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Tonga
0 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Bhutan rank
133rd
Tonga rank
133rd

Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time

  • Bhutan
  • Tonga
00.20.40.60.81200320112019

How they compare

Bhutan currently reports 0 DB15-20 methodology against 0 DB15-20 methodology in Tonga, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.

Across all 17 years both countries report, Tonga has been ahead every year.

Bhutan ranks 133rd and Tonga ranks 133rd of 188 countries.

Head to head by decade

Decade Bhutan Tonga Difference Ahead
2000s 0 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology
2010s 0 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Bhutan or Tonga?
Bhutan, at 0 DB15-20 methodology against 0 DB15-20 methodology in Tonga as of 2019.
What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Bhutan and Tonga?
0 DB15-20 methodology, with Bhutan ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for Bhutan and Tonga?
17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
How do Bhutan and Tonga rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
Bhutan ranks 133rd and Tonga ranks 133rd of 188 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

Individual pages

About this data

Indicator
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology)
Unit
DB15-20 methodology
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
190 places, 3,230 data points, 2003–2019
Last refreshed

The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.