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Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index in Suriname

Suriname: Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2019. ▬ Flat

Latest (2019)
4 DB15-20 methodology
Change on year
unchanged
World rank
65th
of 191 countries
All-time high
4 DB15-20 methodology
in 2013
All-time low
4 DB15-20 methodology
in 2013
Years of data
7
2013–2019

Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index in Suriname, 2013–2019

012342013201620192013: 4 DB15-20 methodology2014: 4 DB15-20 methodology2015: 4 DB15-20 methodology2016: 4 DB15-20 methodology2017: 4 DB15-20 methodology2018: 4 DB15-20 methodology2019: 4 DB15-20 methodology

Source: World Bank. Measured in DB15-20 methodology.

Analysis

The most recent figure for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index in Suriname is 4 DB15-20 methodology, measured in 2019. That is the highest value across all 7 years on record.

Compared with earlier readings it is unchanged over ten years.

That places Suriname 65th out of 191 countries with data for 2019, putting it in the middle of the range.

Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index in Suriname, year by year

Year DB15-20 methodology Change
2013 4 DB15-20 methodology —
2014 4 DB15-20 methodology +0.0%
2015 4 DB15-20 methodology +0.0%
2016 4 DB15-20 methodology +0.0%
2017 4 DB15-20 methodology +0.0%
2018 4 DB15-20 methodology +0.0%
2019 4 DB15-20 methodology +0.0%

Countries ranked near Suriname

  1. 65 Bangladesh 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  2. 65 Nigeria 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  3. 65 Japan 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  4. 65 Brazil 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  5. 65 Australia 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  6. 65 Belgium 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  7. 65 Benin 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  8. 65 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  9. 65 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  10. 65 Botswana 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  11. 65 Burkina Faso 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  12. 65 Canada 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  13. 65 Colombia 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  14. 65 Côte d'Ivoire 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  15. 65 El Salvador 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  16. 65 Fiji 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  17. 65 France 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  18. 65 Guinea-Bissau 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  19. 65 Guyana 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  20. 65 Hungary 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  21. 65 Israel 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  22. 65 Republic of Korea 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  23. 65 Lithuania 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  24. 65 Luxembourg 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  25. 65 Mali 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  26. 65 Niger 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  27. 65 Oman 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  28. 65 Senegal 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  29. 65 Taiwan, China 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  30. 65 Togo 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  31. 65 Tunisia 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  32. 65 Ukraine 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  33. 65 United Arab Emirates 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  34. 65 Uzbekistan 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  35. 65 Viet Nam 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
  36. 65 Zambia 4 DB15-20 methodology compare

See the full ranking of 191 places →

More reference data data for Suriname

All data for Suriname →

Frequently asked questions

What is protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index in Suriname?
Protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index in Suriname was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2019, according to the World Bank.
What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index recorded in Suriname?
The highest recorded value was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index recorded in Suriname?
The lowest recorded value was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
How does Suriname rank for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index?
Suriname ranks 65th out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
Is protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index rising or falling in Suriname?
Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
Where does this Suriname data come from?
The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.

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Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index in Suriname. Statizoid. Retrieved 03 September 2026, from https://reference.statizoid.com/stat/protecting-minority-investors-extent-of-shareholder-rights-index-0-6-db15-20-methodology/suriname/

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About this data

Indicator
Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology)
Unit
DB15-20 methodology
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
191 places, 1,337 data points, 2013–2019
Last refreshed

The extent of shareholder rights index measures the role of shareholders in key corporate decisions. It has six components: (i) whether the sale of 51% of Buyer’s assets requires shareholder approval; (ii) whether shareholders representing 10% of Buyer’s share capital have the right to call for a meeting of shareholders; (iii) whether Buyer must obtain its share­holders’ approval every time it issues new shares; (iv) whether shareholders automatically receive preemption rights when Buyer issues new shares; (v) whether shareholders elect and dismiss the external auditor; (vi) whether changes to the rights of a class of shares are only possible if the holders of the affected shares approve. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.