Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index in Chile
Chile: Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index was 6 DB15-20 methodology in 2019. ▬ Flat
Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index in Chile, 2013–2019
Source: World Bank. Measured in DB15-20 methodology.
Analysis
The most recent figure for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index in Chile is 6 DB15-20 methodology, measured in 2019. That is the highest value across all 7 years on record.
That represents a change of unchanged over ten years.
Chile ranks 1st of 191 countries on this measure, in the top 10%.
Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index in Chile, year by year
| Year | DB15-20 methodology | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 6 DB15-20 methodology | — |
| 2014 | 6 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2015 | 6 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2016 | 6 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2017 | 6 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2018 | 6 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2019 | 6 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
Countries ranked near Chile
- 1 India 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Argentina 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Bulgaria 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Croatia 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Cyprus 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Egypt 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Kazakhstan 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Kenya 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Malta 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Morocco 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Panama 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Papua New Guinea 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Peru 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Slovenia 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Spain 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Turkey 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 United Kingdom 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 1 Zimbabwe 6 DB15-20 methodology compare
More reference data data for Chile
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 0.9268 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 2.22 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 5.33 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.2204 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Agricultural Soils 5.33 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 3.11 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure Management 1.46 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 11.45 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 25.25 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 1.2 (2050)
Frequently asked questions
- What is protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index in Chile?
- Protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index in Chile was 6 DB15-20 methodology in 2019, according to the World Bank.
- What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index recorded in Chile?
- The highest recorded value was 6 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
- What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index recorded in Chile?
- The lowest recorded value was 6 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
- How does Chile rank for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index?
- Chile ranks 1st out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
- Is protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index rising or falling in Chile?
- Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
- Where does this Chile data come from?
- The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.
Download this data
CSV · JSON — 7 observations, free to reuse under CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data).
About this data
The extent of shareholder rights index measures the role of shareholders in key corporate decisions. It has six components: (i) whether the sale of 51% of Buyer’s assets requires shareholder approval; (ii) whether shareholders representing 10% of Buyer’s share capital have the right to call for a meeting of shareholders; (iii) whether Buyer must obtain its shareholders’ approval every time it issues new shares; (iv) whether shareholders automatically receive preemption rights when Buyer issues new shares; (v) whether shareholders elect and dismiss the external auditor; (vi) whether changes to the rights of a class of shares are only possible if the holders of the affected shares approve. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.