Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Poland
Poland: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index was 2 0-10 in 2019. ▬ Flat
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Poland, 2005–2019
Source: World Bank. Measured in 0-10.
Analysis
Poland recorded 2 0-10 for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in 2019. That is the highest value across all 15 years on record.
The figure is unchanged over ten years.
Over the whole period, protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Poland peaked at 2 0-10 in 2005 and was at its lowest, 2 0-10, in 2005.
That places Poland 143rd out of 191 countries with data for 2019, putting it in the middle of the range.
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Poland, year by year
| Year | 0-10 | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2005 | 2 0-10 | — |
| 2006 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2007 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2008 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2009 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2010 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2011 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2012 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2013 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2014 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2015 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2016 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2017 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2018 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2019 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
Averages by decade
| Decade | Average | Lowest | Highest | Years |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 2 0-10 | 2 0-10 | 2 0-10 | 5 |
| 2010s | 2 0-10 | 2 0-10 | 2 0-10 | 10 |
Countries ranked near Poland
- 143 Russian Federation 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Argentina 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Australia 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Barbados 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Belarus 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Bulgaria 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Guatemala 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Morocco 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Qatar 2 0-10 compare
- 143 San Marino 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Ukraine 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Zimbabwe 2 0-10 compare
More reference data data for Poland
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 2.62 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 0.499 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 9.36 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.8896 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Agricultural Soils 9.36 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 8.77 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure Management 5.77 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 2.57 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 43.86 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 4.84 (2050)
Frequently asked questions
- What is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Poland?
- Protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Poland was 2 0-10 in 2019, according to the World Bank.
- What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Poland?
- The highest recorded value was 2 0-10 in 2005.
- What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Poland?
- The lowest recorded value was 2 0-10 in 2005.
- How does Poland rank for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Poland ranks 143rd out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
- Is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index rising or falling in Poland?
- Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
- Where does this Poland data come from?
- The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.
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CSV · JSON — 15 observations, free to reuse under CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data).
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.