Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Belarus
Belarus: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index was 2 0-10 in 2019. ◆ Volatile
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Belarus, 2005–2019
Source: World Bank. Measured in 0-10.
Analysis
Belarus recorded 2 0-10 for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in 2019.
Over the whole period, protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Belarus peaked at 3 0-10 in 2005 and was at its lowest, 0 0-10, in 2007.
That places Belarus 143rd out of 191 countries with data for 2019, putting it in the middle of the range.
The series is highly variable year to year, so single readings are best treated with caution.
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Belarus, year by year
| Year | 0-10 | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2005 | 3 0-10 | — |
| 2006 | 3 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2007 | 0 0-10 | -100.0% |
| 2008 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2009 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2010 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2011 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2012 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2013 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2014 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2015 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2016 | 2 0-10 | — |
| 2017 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2018 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2019 | 2 0-10 | +0.0% |
Averages by decade
| Decade | Average | Lowest | Highest | Years |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 1.2 0-10 | 0 0-10 | 3 0-10 | 5 |
| 2010s | 0.8 0-10 | 0 0-10 | 2 0-10 | 10 |
Countries ranked near Belarus
- 143 Russia 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Argentina 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Australia 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Barbados 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Bulgaria 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Guatemala 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Morocco 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Poland 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Qatar 2 0-10 compare
- 143 San Marino 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Ukraine 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Venezuela 2 0-10 compare
- 143 Zimbabwe 2 0-10 compare
More reference data data for Belarus
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 1.25 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 0.3462 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 5.24 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.3596 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Agricultural Soils 5.24 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 4.18 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure Management 2.85 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 1.84 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 24.26 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 1.96 (2050)
Frequently asked questions
- What is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Belarus?
- Protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Belarus was 2 0-10 in 2019, according to the World Bank.
- What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Belarus?
- The highest recorded value was 3 0-10 in 2005.
- What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Belarus?
- The lowest recorded value was 0 0-10 in 2007.
- How does Belarus rank for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Belarus ranks 143rd out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
- Where does this Belarus data come from?
- The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.
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CSV · JSON — 15 observations, free to reuse under CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data).
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.