Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in New Zealand
New Zealand: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index was 9 0-10 in 2019. ▬ Flat
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in New Zealand, 2005–2019
Source: World Bank. Measured in 0-10.
Analysis
The most recent figure for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in New Zealand is 9 0-10, measured in 2019. That is the highest value across all 15 years on record.
That represents a change of unchanged over ten years.
Over the whole period, protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in New Zealand peaked at 9 0-10 in 2005 and was at its lowest, 9 0-10, in 2005.
New Zealand ranks 4th of 191 countries on this measure, in the top 10%.
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in New Zealand, year by year
| Year | 0-10 | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2005 | 9 0-10 | — |
| 2006 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2007 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2008 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2009 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2010 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2011 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2012 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2013 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2014 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2015 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2016 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2017 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2018 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
| 2019 | 9 0-10 | +0.0% |
Averages by decade
| Decade | Average | Lowest | Highest | Years |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 9 0-10 | 9 0-10 | 9 0-10 | 5 |
| 2010s | 9 0-10 | 9 0-10 | 9 0-10 | 10 |
Countries ranked near New Zealand
- 1 Cambodia 10 0-10 compare
- 1 Kenya 10 0-10 compare
- 1 United Arab Emirates 10 0-10 compare
- 4 Canada 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Israel 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Kuwait 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Malaysia 9 0-10 compare
- 4 North Macedonia 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Rwanda 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Saudi Arabia 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Singapore 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Slovenia 9 0-10 compare
- 4 Trinidad and Tobago 9 0-10 compare
More reference data data for New Zealand
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 0.4532 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 9.92 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 10.93 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.0459 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Agricultural Soils 10.93 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 1.52 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure Management 1.53 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 42.17 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 47.53 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.2499 (2050)
Frequently asked questions
- What is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in New Zealand?
- Protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in New Zealand was 9 0-10 in 2019, according to the World Bank.
- What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in New Zealand?
- The highest recorded value was 9 0-10 in 2005.
- What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in New Zealand?
- The lowest recorded value was 9 0-10 in 2005.
- How does New Zealand rank for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- New Zealand ranks 4th out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
- Is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index rising or falling in New Zealand?
- Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
- Where does this New Zealand data come from?
- The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.
Download this data
CSV · JSON — 15 observations, free to reuse under CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data).
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.