Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Namibia

Namibia: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index was 5 0-10 in 2019. ▬ Flat

Latest (2019)
5 0-10
Change on year
unchanged
World rank
75th
of 191 countries
All-time high
5 0-10
in 2005
All-time low
5 0-10
in 2005
Years of data
15
2005–2019

Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Namibia, 2005–2019

0123452005201220192005: 5 0-102006: 5 0-102007: 5 0-102008: 5 0-102009: 5 0-102010: 5 0-102011: 5 0-102012: 5 0-102013: 5 0-102014: 5 0-102015: 5 0-102016: 5 0-102017: 5 0-102018: 5 0-102019: 5 0-10

Source: World Bank. Measured in 0-10.

Analysis

Namibia recorded 5 0-10 for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in 2019. That is the highest value across all 15 years on record.

That represents a change of unchanged over ten years.

Over the whole period, protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Namibia peaked at 5 0-10 in 2005 and was at its lowest, 5 0-10, in 2005.

That places Namibia 75th out of 191 countries with data for 2019, putting it in the middle of the range.

Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Namibia, year by year

Annual values for Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10) in Namibia, 2005 to 2019.
Year 0-10 Change
2005 5 0-10
2006 5 0-10 +0.0%
2007 5 0-10 +0.0%
2008 5 0-10 +0.0%
2009 5 0-10 +0.0%
2010 5 0-10 +0.0%
2011 5 0-10 +0.0%
2012 5 0-10 +0.0%
2013 5 0-10 +0.0%
2014 5 0-10 +0.0%
2015 5 0-10 +0.0%
2016 5 0-10 +0.0%
2017 5 0-10 +0.0%
2018 5 0-10 +0.0%
2019 5 0-10 +0.0%

Averages by decade

DecadeAverage LowestHighest Years
2000s 5 0-10 5 0-10 5 0-10 5
2010s 5 0-10 5 0-10 5 0-10 10

Countries ranked near Namibia

  1. 75 Indonesia 5 0-10 compare
  2. 75 Mexico 5 0-10 compare
  3. 75 Austria 5 0-10 compare
  4. 75 Bahamas 5 0-10 compare
  5. 75 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 5 0-10 compare
  6. 75 Cape Verde 5 0-10 compare
  7. 75 Costa Rica 5 0-10 compare
  8. 75 Denmark 5 0-10 compare
  9. 75 Ecuador 5 0-10 compare
  10. 75 Eswatini 5 0-10 compare
  11. 75 Gambia 5 0-10 compare
  12. 75 Germany 5 0-10 compare
  13. 75 Ghana 5 0-10 compare
  14. 75 Guyana 5 0-10 compare
  15. 75 Iceland 5 0-10 compare
  16. 75 Iraq 5 0-10 compare
  17. 75 Kiribati 5 0-10 compare
  18. 75 Kyrgyzstan 5 0-10 compare
  19. 75 Luxembourg 5 0-10 compare
  20. 75 Nicaragua 5 0-10 compare
  21. 75 Norway 5 0-10 compare
  22. 75 Oman 5 0-10 compare
  23. 75 Papua New Guinea 5 0-10 compare
  24. 75 Paraguay 5 0-10 compare
  25. 75 Portugal 5 0-10 compare
  26. 75 Sri Lanka 5 0-10 compare
  27. 75 Switzerland 5 0-10 compare
  28. 75 Syrian Arab Republic 5 0-10 compare
  29. 75 Taiwan, China 5 0-10 compare
  30. 75 Türkiye 5 0-10 compare
  31. 75 Uganda 5 0-10 compare
  32. 75 Palestine, State of 5 0-10 compare

See the full ranking of 191 places →

More reference data data for Namibia

All data for Namibia →

Frequently asked questions

What is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Namibia?
Protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Namibia was 5 0-10 in 2019, according to the World Bank.
What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Namibia?
The highest recorded value was 5 0-10 in 2005.
What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Namibia?
The lowest recorded value was 5 0-10 in 2005.
How does Namibia rank for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
Namibia ranks 75th out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
Is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index rising or falling in Namibia?
Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
Where does this Namibia data come from?
The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.

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Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Namibia. Statizoid. Retrieved 25 August 2026, from https://reference.statizoid.com/stat/protecting-minority-investors-extent-of-director-liability-index-0-10/namibia/

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About this data

Indicator
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10)
Unit
0-10
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
191 places, 2,865 data points, 2005–2019
Last refreshed

The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the trans­action upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.