Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Costa Rica

Costa Rica: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index was 5 0-10 in 2019. ▬ Flat

Latest (2019)
5 0-10
Change on year
unchanged
World rank
75th
of 191 countries
All-time high
5 0-10
in 2005
All-time low
5 0-10
in 2005
Years of data
15
2005–2019

Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Costa Rica, 2005–2019

0123452005201220192005: 5 0-102006: 5 0-102007: 5 0-102008: 5 0-102009: 5 0-102010: 5 0-102011: 5 0-102012: 5 0-102013: 5 0-102014: 5 0-102015: 5 0-102016: 5 0-102017: 5 0-102018: 5 0-102019: 5 0-10

Source: World Bank. Measured in 0-10.

Analysis

Costa Rica recorded 5 0-10 for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in 2019. That is the highest value across all 15 years on record.

Compared with earlier readings it is unchanged over ten years.

Over the whole period, protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Costa Rica peaked at 5 0-10 in 2005 and was at its lowest, 5 0-10, in 2005.

Costa Rica ranks 75th of 191 countries on this measure, in the middle of the range.

Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Costa Rica, year by year

Annual values for Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10) in Costa Rica, 2005 to 2019.
Year 0-10 Change
2005 5 0-10
2006 5 0-10 +0.0%
2007 5 0-10 +0.0%
2008 5 0-10 +0.0%
2009 5 0-10 +0.0%
2010 5 0-10 +0.0%
2011 5 0-10 +0.0%
2012 5 0-10 +0.0%
2013 5 0-10 +0.0%
2014 5 0-10 +0.0%
2015 5 0-10 +0.0%
2016 5 0-10 +0.0%
2017 5 0-10 +0.0%
2018 5 0-10 +0.0%
2019 5 0-10 +0.0%

Averages by decade

DecadeAverage LowestHighest Years
2000s 5 0-10 5 0-10 5 0-10 5
2010s 5 0-10 5 0-10 5 0-10 10

Countries ranked near Costa Rica

  1. 75 Indonesia 5 0-10 compare
  2. 75 Mexico 5 0-10 compare
  3. 75 Austria 5 0-10 compare
  4. 75 Bahamas 5 0-10 compare
  5. 75 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 5 0-10 compare
  6. 75 Cape Verde 5 0-10 compare
  7. 75 Denmark 5 0-10 compare
  8. 75 Ecuador 5 0-10 compare
  9. 75 Eswatini 5 0-10 compare
  10. 75 Gambia 5 0-10 compare
  11. 75 Germany 5 0-10 compare
  12. 75 Ghana 5 0-10 compare
  13. 75 Guyana 5 0-10 compare
  14. 75 Iceland 5 0-10 compare
  15. 75 Iraq 5 0-10 compare
  16. 75 Kiribati 5 0-10 compare
  17. 75 Kyrgyzstan 5 0-10 compare
  18. 75 Luxembourg 5 0-10 compare
  19. 75 Namibia 5 0-10 compare
  20. 75 Nicaragua 5 0-10 compare
  21. 75 Norway 5 0-10 compare
  22. 75 Oman 5 0-10 compare
  23. 75 Papua New Guinea 5 0-10 compare
  24. 75 Paraguay 5 0-10 compare
  25. 75 Portugal 5 0-10 compare
  26. 75 Sri Lanka 5 0-10 compare
  27. 75 Switzerland 5 0-10 compare
  28. 75 Syrian Arab Republic 5 0-10 compare
  29. 75 Taiwan, China 5 0-10 compare
  30. 75 Türkiye 5 0-10 compare
  31. 75 Uganda 5 0-10 compare
  32. 75 Palestine, State of 5 0-10 compare

See the full ranking of 191 places →

More reference data data for Costa Rica

All data for Costa Rica →

Frequently asked questions

What is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Costa Rica?
Protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Costa Rica was 5 0-10 in 2019, according to the World Bank.
What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Costa Rica?
The highest recorded value was 5 0-10 in 2005.
What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Costa Rica?
The lowest recorded value was 5 0-10 in 2005.
How does Costa Rica rank for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
Costa Rica ranks 75th out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
Is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index rising or falling in Costa Rica?
Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
Where does this Costa Rica data come from?
The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.

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Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Costa Rica. Statizoid. Retrieved 04 September 2026, from https://reference.statizoid.com/stat/protecting-minority-investors-extent-of-director-liability-index-0-10/costa-rica/

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About this data

Indicator
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10)
Unit
0-10
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
191 places, 2,865 data points, 2005–2019
Last refreshed

The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the trans­action upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.