Protecting minority: Extent of director … director liability 0-10 in Brunei

Brunei: Protecting minority: Extent of director … director liability 0-10 was 8 0-10 in 2019. ◆ Volatile

Latest (2019)
8 0-10
Change on year
unchanged
World rank
16th
of 191 countries
All-time high
8 0-10
in 2016
All-time low
2 0-10
in 2005
Years of data
15
2005–2019

Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Brunei, 2005–2019

24682005201220192005: 2 0-102006: 2 0-102007: 2 0-102008: 2 0-102009: 2 0-102010: 2 0-102011: 5 0-102012: 5 0-102013: 5 0-102014: 5 0-102015: 5 0-102016: 8 0-102017: 8 0-102018: 8 0-102019: 8 0-10

Source: World Bank. Measured in 0-10.

Analysis

In 2019, protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Brunei stood at 8 0-10. That is the highest value across all 15 years on record.

That represents a change of up 300.0% over ten years.

Over the whole period, protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Brunei peaked at 8 0-10 in 2016 and was at its lowest, 2 0-10, in 2005.

Brunei ranks 16th of 191 countries on this measure, in the top 10%.

The series is highly variable year to year, so single readings are best treated with caution.

Protecting minority: Extent of director … director liability 0-10 in Brunei, year by year

Annual values for Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10) in Brunei, 2005 to 2019.
Year 0-10 Change
2005 2 0-10 —
2006 2 0-10 +0.0%
2007 2 0-10 +0.0%
2008 2 0-10 +0.0%
2009 2 0-10 +0.0%
2010 2 0-10 +0.0%
2011 5 0-10 +150.0%
2012 5 0-10 +0.0%
2013 5 0-10 +0.0%
2014 5 0-10 +0.0%
2015 5 0-10 +0.0%
2016 8 0-10 +60.0%
2017 8 0-10 +0.0%
2018 8 0-10 +0.0%
2019 8 0-10 +0.0%

Brunei compared with similar countries

  • Brunei's 8 0-10 is above the median for high income countries, which is 5 0-10, 1.6× the median. (62 countries reporting)
  • Brunei's 8 0-10 is above the median for East Asia & Pacific, which is 5.5 0-10, 1.5× the median. (28 countries reporting)

Averages by decade

DecadeAverage LowestHighest Years
2000s 2 0-10 2 0-10 2 0-10 5
2010s 5.9 0-10 2 0-10 8 0-10 10

Countries ranked near Brunei

  1. 15 United States 8.6 0-10 compare
  2. 16 Brazil 8 0-10 compare
  3. 16 Antigua and Barbuda 8 0-10 compare
  4. 16 Botswana 8 0-10 compare
  5. 16 Djibouti 8 0-10 compare
  6. 16 Dominica 8 0-10 compare
  7. 16 Fiji 8 0-10 compare
  8. 16 Grenada 8 0-10 compare
  9. 16 Honduras 8 0-10 compare
  10. 16 Hong Kong 8 0-10 compare
  11. 16 Ireland 8 0-10 compare
  12. 16 Jamaica 8 0-10 compare
  13. 16 Maldives 8 0-10 compare
  14. 16 Mauritius 8 0-10 compare
  15. 16 Mongolia 8 0-10 compare
  16. 16 Montenegro 8 0-10 compare
  17. 16 Seychelles 8 0-10 compare
  18. 16 Sierra Leone 8 0-10 compare
  19. 16 South Africa 8 0-10 compare
  20. 16 Saint Kitts and Nevis 8 0-10 compare
  21. 16 Saint Lucia 8 0-10 compare
  22. 16 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 8 0-10 compare

See the full ranking of 191 places →

More reference data data for Brunei

All data for Brunei →

Frequently asked questions

What is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Brunei?
Protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index in Brunei was 8 0-10 in 2019, according to the World Bank.
What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Brunei?
The highest recorded value was 8 0-10 in 2016.
What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index recorded in Brunei?
The lowest recorded value was 2 0-10 in 2005.
How does Brunei rank for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
Brunei ranks 16th out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
Is protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index rising or falling in Brunei?
Over the last ten years it is up 300.0%. The long-run trend across the full record is volatile.
Where does this Brunei data come from?
The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.

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Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index in Brunei. Statizoid. Retrieved 20 November 2026, from https://reference.statizoid.com/stat/protecting-minority-investors-extent-of-director-liability-index-0-10/brunei-darussalam/

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About this data

Indicator
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10)
Unit
0-10
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
191 places, 2,865 data points, 2005–2019
Last refreshed

The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the trans­action upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.