Brunei Darussalam vs Djibouti: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time
- Brunei Darussalam
- Djibouti
How they compare
Brunei Darussalam currently reports 8 0-10 against 8 0-10 in Djibouti, a difference of 0 0-10.
The two have swapped places 2 times across 15 shared years of data; in 2005 it was Djibouti ahead.
Brunei Darussalam ranks 16th and Djibouti ranks 16th of 191 countries.
Across the 2 decades both report, Brunei Darussalam averaged higher in 1 and Djibouti in 1.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Brunei Darussalam | Djibouti | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 2 0-10 | 3 0-10 | 1 0-10 | Djibouti |
| 2010s | 5.9 0-10 | 4.4 0-10 | 1.5 0-10 | Brunei Darussalam |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Brunei Darussalam or Djibouti?
- Brunei Darussalam, at 8 0-10 against 8 0-10 in Djibouti as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Brunei Darussalam and Djibouti?
- 0 0-10, with Brunei Darussalam ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Brunei Darussalam and Djibouti?
- 15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
- How do Brunei Darussalam and Djibouti rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Brunei Darussalam ranks 16th and Djibouti ranks 16th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.