South Sudan vs Saint Lucia: Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6)
Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) over time
- South Sudan
- Saint Lucia
How they compare
South Sudan currently reports 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Saint Lucia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Saint Lucia has been ahead every year.
South Sudan ranks 151st and Saint Lucia ranks 151st of 191 countries.
Saint Lucia has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | South Sudan | Saint Lucia | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 2 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | Saint Lucia |
| 2010s | 1.8 DB15-20 methodology | 2 DB15-20 methodology | 0.2 DB15-20 methodology | Saint Lucia |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6), South Sudan or Saint Lucia?
- South Sudan, at 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Saint Lucia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6) between South Sudan and Saint Lucia?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with South Sudan ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for South Sudan and Saint Lucia?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do South Sudan and Saint Lucia rank globally for resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6)?
- South Sudan ranks 151st and Saint Lucia ranks 151st of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The management of debtor's assets index has six components: (i) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can continue performing contracts essential to the debtor’s survival; (ii) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can reject overly burdensome contracts; (iii) whether undervalued transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (iv) whether transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings that give preference to one or several creditors can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (v) whether the insolvency framework includes specific provisions that allow the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf), after commencement of insolvency proceedings, to obtain financing necessary to function during the proceedings; and (vi) whether post-commencement finance receives priority over ordinary unsecured creditors during distribution of assets.