Rwanda vs Thailand: Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6)
Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) over time
- Rwanda
- Thailand
How they compare
Rwanda currently reports 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Thailand, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 2 times across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Thailand ahead.
Rwanda ranks 74th and Thailand ranks 74th of 191 countries.
Thailand has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Rwanda | Thailand | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 2.29 DB15-20 methodology | 5 DB15-20 methodology | 2.71 DB15-20 methodology | Thailand |
| 2010s | 4.8 DB15-20 methodology | 5 DB15-20 methodology | 0.2 DB15-20 methodology | Thailand |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6), Rwanda or Thailand?
- Rwanda, at 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Thailand as of 2019.
- What is the difference in resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6) between Rwanda and Thailand?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Rwanda ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Rwanda and Thailand?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Rwanda and Thailand rank globally for resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6)?
- Rwanda ranks 74th and Thailand ranks 74th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The management of debtor's assets index has six components: (i) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can continue performing contracts essential to the debtor’s survival; (ii) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can reject overly burdensome contracts; (iii) whether undervalued transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (iv) whether transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings that give preference to one or several creditors can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (v) whether the insolvency framework includes specific provisions that allow the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf), after commencement of insolvency proceedings, to obtain financing necessary to function during the proceedings; and (vi) whether post-commencement finance receives priority over ordinary unsecured creditors during distribution of assets.