Libya vs Oman: Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6)
Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) over time
- Libya
- Oman
How they compare
Libya currently reports 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Oman, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Oman has been ahead every year.
Libya ranks 97th and Oman ranks 97th of 191 countries.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Libya | Oman | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 4 DB15-20 methodology | 4 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | — |
| 2010s | 4 DB15-20 methodology | 4 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | — |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6), Libya or Oman?
- Libya, at 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Oman as of 2019.
- What is the difference in resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6) between Libya and Oman?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Libya ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Libya and Oman?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Libya and Oman rank globally for resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6)?
- Libya ranks 97th and Oman ranks 97th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The management of debtor's assets index has six components: (i) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can continue performing contracts essential to the debtor’s survival; (ii) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can reject overly burdensome contracts; (iii) whether undervalued transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (iv) whether transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings that give preference to one or several creditors can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (v) whether the insolvency framework includes specific provisions that allow the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf), after commencement of insolvency proceedings, to obtain financing necessary to function during the proceedings; and (vi) whether post-commencement finance receives priority over ordinary unsecured creditors during distribution of assets.