Saint Kitts and Nevis vs Uruguay: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology) over time
- Saint Kitts and Nevis
- Uruguay
How they compare
Saint Kitts and Nevis currently reports 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Uruguay, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Uruguay has been ahead every year.
Saint Kitts and Nevis ranks 58th and Uruguay ranks 58th of 191 countries.
Uruguay has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Saint Kitts and Nevis | Uruguay | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | Uruguay |
| 2010s | 0.6 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0.4 DB15-20 methodology | Uruguay |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Saint Kitts and Nevis or Uruguay?
- Saint Kitts and Nevis, at 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Uruguay as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and Uruguay?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Saint Kitts and Nevis ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Saint Kitts and Nevis and Uruguay?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Saint Kitts and Nevis and Uruguay rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Saint Kitts and Nevis ranks 58th and Uruguay ranks 58th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.