Saudi Arabia vs Viet Nam: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Saudi Arabia
- Viet Nam
How they compare
Saudi Arabia currently reports 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Viet Nam, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Viet Nam has been ahead every year.
Saudi Arabia ranks 31st and Viet Nam ranks 31st of 190 countries.
Viet Nam has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Saudi Arabia | Viet Nam | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 0.7143 DB15-20 methodology | 0.7143 DB15-20 methodology | Viet Nam |
| 2010s | 0.2 DB15-20 methodology | 1.5 DB15-20 methodology | 1.3 DB15-20 methodology | Viet Nam |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Saudi Arabia or Viet Nam?
- Saudi Arabia, at 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Viet Nam as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Saudi Arabia ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Saudi Arabia ranks 31st and Viet Nam ranks 31st of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.