San Marino vs Uruguay: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- San Marino
- Uruguay
How they compare
San Marino currently reports 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Uruguay, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Uruguay has been ahead every year.
San Marino ranks 57th and Uruguay ranks 57th of 190 countries.
Uruguay has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | San Marino | Uruguay | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0.5714 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0.4286 DB15-20 methodology | Uruguay |
| 2010s | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | β |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), San Marino or Uruguay?
- San Marino, at 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Uruguay as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between San Marino and Uruguay?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with San Marino ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for San Marino and Uruguay?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do San Marino and Uruguay rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- San Marino ranks 57th and Uruguay ranks 57th of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.