San Marino, Republic of vs Sweden: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- San Marino, Republic of
- Sweden
How they compare
San Marino, Republic of currently reports 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Sweden, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Sweden has been ahead every year.
San Marino, Republic of ranks 57th and Sweden ranks 57th of 190 countries.
Sweden has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | San Marino, Republic of | Sweden | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0.5714 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0.4286 DB15-20 methodology | Sweden |
| 2010s | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | β |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), San Marino, Republic of or Sweden?
- San Marino, Republic of, at 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Sweden as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between San Marino, Republic of and Sweden?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with San Marino, Republic of ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for San Marino, Republic of and Sweden?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do San Marino, Republic of and Sweden rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- San Marino, Republic of ranks 57th and Sweden ranks 57th of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.