Nepal vs Spain: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)

Nepal
2 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Spain
2 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Nepal rank
30th
Spain rank
30th

Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time

  • Nepal
  • Spain
00.511.52200320112019

How they compare

Nepal currently reports 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Spain, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.

Across all 17 years both countries report, Spain has been ahead every year.

Nepal ranks 30th and Spain ranks 30th of 188 countries.

Spain has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.

Head to head by decade

Decade Nepal Spain Difference Ahead
2000s 0.8571 DB15-20 methodology 1.71 DB15-20 methodology 0.8571 DB15-20 methodology Spain
2010s 2 DB15-20 methodology 2 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Nepal or Spain?
Nepal, at 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Spain as of 2019.
What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Nepal and Spain?
0 DB15-20 methodology, with Nepal ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for Nepal and Spain?
17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
How do Nepal and Spain rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
Nepal ranks 30th and Spain ranks 30th of 188 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

Individual pages

About this data

Indicator
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology)
Unit
DB15-20 methodology
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
190 places, 3,230 data points, 2003–2019
Last refreshed

The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.