Jordan vs Peru: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)

Jordan
0.5 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Peru
0.5 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Jordan rank
86th
Peru rank
86th

Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time

  • Jordan
  • Peru
00.10.20.30.40.5200320112019

How they compare

Jordan currently reports 0.5 DB15-20 methodology against 0.5 DB15-20 methodology in Peru, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.

Across all 17 years both countries report, Peru has been ahead every year.

Jordan ranks 86th and Peru ranks 86th of 188 countries.

Peru has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.

Head to head by decade

Decade Jordan Peru Difference Ahead
2000s 0 DB15-20 methodology 0.5 DB15-20 methodology 0.5 DB15-20 methodology Peru
2010s 0.05 DB15-20 methodology 0.5 DB15-20 methodology 0.45 DB15-20 methodology Peru

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Jordan or Peru?
Jordan, at 0.5 DB15-20 methodology against 0.5 DB15-20 methodology in Peru as of 2019.
What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Jordan and Peru?
0 DB15-20 methodology, with Jordan ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for Jordan and Peru?
17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
How do Jordan and Peru rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
Jordan ranks 86th and Peru ranks 86th of 188 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

Individual pages

About this data

Indicator
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology)
Unit
DB15-20 methodology
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
190 places, 3,230 data points, 2003–2019
Last refreshed

The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.