Grenada vs Iceland: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Grenada
- Iceland
How they compare
Grenada currently reports 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Iceland, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Iceland has been ahead every year.
Grenada ranks 55th and Iceland ranks 55th of 188 countries.
Iceland has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Grenada | Iceland | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 0.5 DB15-20 methodology | 0.5 DB15-20 methodology | Iceland |
| 2010s | 0.3 DB15-20 methodology | 0.95 DB15-20 methodology | 0.65 DB15-20 methodology | Iceland |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Grenada or Iceland?
- Grenada, at 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Iceland as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Grenada and Iceland?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Grenada ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Grenada and Iceland?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Grenada and Iceland rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Grenada ranks 55th and Iceland ranks 55th of 188 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.