Egypt, Arab Republic of vs Suriname: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Egypt, Arab Republic of
- Suriname
How they compare
Egypt, Arab Republic of currently reports 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Suriname, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Suriname has been ahead every year.
Egypt, Arab Republic of ranks 57th and Suriname ranks 57th of 190 countries.
Suriname has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Egypt, Arab Republic of | Suriname | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | Suriname |
| 2010s | 0.2 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0.8 DB15-20 methodology | Suriname |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Egypt, Arab Republic of or Suriname?
- Egypt, Arab Republic of, at 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Suriname as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Egypt, Arab Republic of and Suriname?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Egypt, Arab Republic of ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Egypt, Arab Republic of and Suriname?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Egypt, Arab Republic of and Suriname rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Egypt, Arab Republic of ranks 57th and Suriname ranks 57th of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.