Congo vs Jordan: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)

Congo
0.5 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Jordan
0.5 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Congo rank
86th
Jordan rank
86th

Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time

  • Congo
  • Jordan
00.10.20.30.40.5200320112019

How they compare

Congo currently reports 0.5 DB15-20 methodology against 0.5 DB15-20 methodology in Jordan, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.

The two have swapped places 1 time across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Congo ahead.

Congo ranks 86th and Jordan ranks 86th of 188 countries.

Congo has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.

Head to head by decade

Decade Congo Jordan Difference Ahead
2000s 0.5 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology 0.5 DB15-20 methodology Congo
2010s 0.5 DB15-20 methodology 0.05 DB15-20 methodology 0.45 DB15-20 methodology Congo

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Congo or Jordan?
Congo, at 0.5 DB15-20 methodology against 0.5 DB15-20 methodology in Jordan as of 2019.
What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Congo and Jordan?
0 DB15-20 methodology, with Congo ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for Congo and Jordan?
17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
How do Congo and Jordan rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
Congo ranks 86th and Jordan ranks 86th of 188 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

Individual pages

About this data

Indicator
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology)
Unit
DB15-20 methodology
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
190 places, 3,230 data points, 2003–2019
Last refreshed

The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.