China vs Latvia: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)

China
2.5 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Latvia
2.5 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
China rank
23rd
Latvia rank
23rd

Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time

  • China
  • Latvia
00.511.522.5200320112019

How they compare

China currently reports 2.5 DB15-20 methodology against 2.5 DB15-20 methodology in Latvia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.

The two have swapped places 2 times across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Latvia ahead.

China ranks 23rd and Latvia ranks 23rd of 188 countries.

China has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.

Head to head by decade

Decade China Latvia Difference Ahead
2000s 0.7143 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology 0.7143 DB15-20 methodology China
2010s 2.5 DB15-20 methodology 2.25 DB15-20 methodology 0.25 DB15-20 methodology China

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), China or Latvia?
China, at 2.5 DB15-20 methodology against 2.5 DB15-20 methodology in Latvia as of 2019.
What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between China and Latvia?
0 DB15-20 methodology, with China ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for China and Latvia?
17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
How do China and Latvia rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
China ranks 23rd and Latvia ranks 23rd of 188 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

Individual pages

About this data

Indicator
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology)
Unit
DB15-20 methodology
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
190 places, 3,230 data points, 2003–2019
Last refreshed

The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.