Chile vs Saudi Arabia: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Chile
- Saudi Arabia
How they compare
Chile currently reports 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Saudi Arabia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 2 times across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Saudi Arabia ahead.
Chile ranks 30th and Saudi Arabia ranks 30th of 188 countries.
Chile has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Chile | Saudi Arabia | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | — |
| 2010s | 1.2 DB15-20 methodology | 0.2 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | Chile |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Chile or Saudi Arabia?
- Chile, at 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Saudi Arabia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Chile and Saudi Arabia?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Chile ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Chile and Saudi Arabia?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Chile and Saudi Arabia rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Chile ranks 30th and Saudi Arabia ranks 30th of 188 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.