Cape Verde vs Grenada: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)

Cape Verde
1 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Grenada
1 DB15-20 methodology
in 2019
Cape Verde rank
55th
Grenada rank
55th

Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time

  • Cape Verde
  • Grenada
00.20.40.60.81200320112019

How they compare

Cape Verde currently reports 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Grenada, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.

Across all 17 years both countries report, Grenada has been ahead every year.

Cape Verde ranks 55th and Grenada ranks 55th of 188 countries.

Head to head by decade

Decade Cape Verde Grenada Difference Ahead
2000s 0 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology
2010s 0.3 DB15-20 methodology 0.3 DB15-20 methodology 0 DB15-20 methodology

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Cape Verde or Grenada?
Cape Verde, at 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in Grenada as of 2019.
What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Cape Verde and Grenada?
0 DB15-20 methodology, with Cape Verde ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for Cape Verde and Grenada?
17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
How do Cape Verde and Grenada rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
Cape Verde ranks 55th and Grenada ranks 55th of 188 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

Individual pages

About this data

Indicator
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology)
Unit
DB15-20 methodology
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
190 places, 3,230 data points, 2003–2019
Last refreshed

The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.