Brunei vs Djibouti: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Brunei
- Djibouti
How they compare
Brunei currently reports 1.5 DB15-20 methodology against 1.5 DB15-20 methodology in Djibouti, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 2 times across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Djibouti ahead.
Brunei ranks 47th and Djibouti ranks 47th of 191 countries.
Djibouti has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Brunei | Djibouti | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | Djibouti |
| 2010s | 0.6 DB15-20 methodology | 0.85 DB15-20 methodology | 0.25 DB15-20 methodology | Djibouti |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Brunei or Djibouti?
- Brunei, at 1.5 DB15-20 methodology against 1.5 DB15-20 methodology in Djibouti as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Brunei and Djibouti?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Brunei ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Brunei and Djibouti?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Brunei and Djibouti rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Brunei ranks 47th and Djibouti ranks 47th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.