Brazil vs Saudi Arabia: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Brazil
- Saudi Arabia
How they compare
Brazil currently reports 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Saudi Arabia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 2 times across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Saudi Arabia ahead.
Brazil ranks 31st and Saudi Arabia ranks 31st of 190 countries.
Brazil has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Brazil | Saudi Arabia | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 1.14 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 1.14 DB15-20 methodology | Brazil |
| 2010s | 2 DB15-20 methodology | 0.2 DB15-20 methodology | 1.8 DB15-20 methodology | Brazil |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Brazil or Saudi Arabia?
- Brazil, at 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Saudi Arabia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Brazil and Saudi Arabia?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Brazil ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Brazil and Saudi Arabia?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Brazil and Saudi Arabia rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Brazil ranks 31st and Saudi Arabia ranks 31st of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.