Bolivia vs San Marino, Republic of: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Bolivia
- San Marino, Republic of
How they compare
Bolivia currently reports 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in San Marino, Republic of, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Bolivia ahead.
Bolivia ranks 57th and San Marino, Republic of ranks 57th of 190 countries.
Bolivia has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Bolivia | San Marino, Republic of | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0.5714 DB15-20 methodology | 0.4286 DB15-20 methodology | Bolivia |
| 2010s | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | β |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Bolivia or San Marino, Republic of?
- Bolivia, at 1 DB15-20 methodology against 1 DB15-20 methodology in San Marino, Republic of as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Bolivia and San Marino, Republic of?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Bolivia ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Bolivia and San Marino, Republic of?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Bolivia and San Marino, Republic of rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Bolivia ranks 57th and San Marino, Republic of ranks 57th of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.