Bahrain vs Kyrgyzstan: Reorganization proceedings index (0-3)
Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) over time
- Bahrain
- Kyrgyzstan
How they compare
Bahrain currently reports 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Kyrgyzstan, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Kyrgyzstan has been ahead every year.
Bahrain ranks 31st and Kyrgyzstan ranks 31st of 190 countries.
Kyrgyzstan has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Bahrain | Kyrgyzstan | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 0 DB15-20 methodology | 2 DB15-20 methodology | 2 DB15-20 methodology | Kyrgyzstan |
| 2010s | 0.2 DB15-20 methodology | 2 DB15-20 methodology | 1.8 DB15-20 methodology | Kyrgyzstan |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher reorganization proceedings index (0-3), Bahrain or Kyrgyzstan?
- Bahrain, at 2 DB15-20 methodology against 2 DB15-20 methodology in Kyrgyzstan as of 2019.
- What is the difference in reorganization proceedings index (0-3) between Bahrain and Kyrgyzstan?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Bahrain ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Bahrain and Kyrgyzstan?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Bahrain and Kyrgyzstan rank globally for reorganization proceedings index (0-3)?
- Bahrain ranks 31st and Kyrgyzstan ranks 31st of 190 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Reorganization proceedings index (0-3) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The reorganization proceedings index has three components: (i) whether the reorganization plan is voted on only by the creditors whose rights are modified or affected by the plan; (ii) whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, each class votes separately and the creditors within each class are treated equally; and (iii) whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation.