Viet Nam vs Zambia: Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index over time
- Viet Nam
- Zambia
How they compare
Viet Nam currently reports 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Zambia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 7 shared years of data; in 2013 it was Viet Nam ahead.
Viet Nam ranks 65th and Zambia ranks 65th of 191 countries.
Viet Nam has averaged higher in every one of the 1 decades both report.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index, Viet Nam or Zambia?
- Viet Nam, at 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Zambia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index between Viet Nam and Zambia?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Viet Nam ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Viet Nam and Zambia?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Viet Nam and Zambia rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index?
- Viet Nam ranks 65th and Zambia ranks 65th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of shareholder rights index measures the role of shareholders in key corporate decisions. It has six components: (i) whether the sale of 51% of Buyer’s assets requires shareholder approval; (ii) whether shareholders representing 10% of Buyer’s share capital have the right to call for a meeting of shareholders; (iii) whether Buyer must obtain its shareholders’ approval every time it issues new shares; (iv) whether shareholders automatically receive preemption rights when Buyer issues new shares; (v) whether shareholders elect and dismiss the external auditor; (vi) whether changes to the rights of a class of shares are only possible if the holders of the affected shares approve. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.