Namibia vs Tanzania, United Republic of: Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index over time
- Namibia
- Tanzania, United Republic of
How they compare
Namibia currently reports 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Tanzania, United Republic of, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 7 years both countries report, Tanzania, United Republic of has been ahead every year.
Namibia ranks 102nd and Tanzania, United Republic of ranks 102nd of 191 countries.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index, Namibia or Tanzania, United Republic of?
- Namibia, at 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Tanzania, United Republic of as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index between Namibia and Tanzania, United Republic of?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Namibia ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Namibia and Tanzania, United Republic of?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Namibia and Tanzania, United Republic of rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index?
- Namibia ranks 102nd and Tanzania, United Republic of ranks 102nd of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of shareholder rights index measures the role of shareholders in key corporate decisions. It has six components: (i) whether the sale of 51% of Buyer’s assets requires shareholder approval; (ii) whether shareholders representing 10% of Buyer’s share capital have the right to call for a meeting of shareholders; (iii) whether Buyer must obtain its shareholders’ approval every time it issues new shares; (iv) whether shareholders automatically receive preemption rights when Buyer issues new shares; (v) whether shareholders elect and dismiss the external auditor; (vi) whether changes to the rights of a class of shares are only possible if the holders of the affected shares approve. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.