Namibia vs Saint Kitts and Nevis: Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index over time
- Namibia
- Saint Kitts and Nevis
How they compare
Namibia currently reports 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Saint Kitts and Nevis, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 7 years both countries report, Saint Kitts and Nevis has been ahead every year.
Namibia ranks 102nd and Saint Kitts and Nevis ranks 102nd of 191 countries.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index, Namibia or Saint Kitts and Nevis?
- Namibia, at 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Saint Kitts and Nevis as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index between Namibia and Saint Kitts and Nevis?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Namibia ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Namibia and Saint Kitts and Nevis?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Namibia and Saint Kitts and Nevis rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index?
- Namibia ranks 102nd and Saint Kitts and Nevis ranks 102nd of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of shareholder rights index measures the role of shareholders in key corporate decisions. It has six components: (i) whether the sale of 51% of Buyer’s assets requires shareholder approval; (ii) whether shareholders representing 10% of Buyer’s share capital have the right to call for a meeting of shareholders; (iii) whether Buyer must obtain its shareholders’ approval every time it issues new shares; (iv) whether shareholders automatically receive preemption rights when Buyer issues new shares; (v) whether shareholders elect and dismiss the external auditor; (vi) whether changes to the rights of a class of shares are only possible if the holders of the affected shares approve. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.