Bolivia, Plurinational State of vs Botswana: Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index over time
- Bolivia, Plurinational State of
- Botswana
How they compare
Bolivia, Plurinational State of currently reports 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Botswana, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 7 years both countries report, Botswana has been ahead every year.
Bolivia, Plurinational State of ranks 65th and Botswana ranks 65th of 191 countries.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index, Bolivia, Plurinational State of or Botswana?
- Bolivia, Plurinational State of, at 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Botswana as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index between Bolivia, Plurinational State of and Botswana?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Bolivia, Plurinational State of ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Bolivia, Plurinational State of and Botswana?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Bolivia, Plurinational State of and Botswana rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of shareholder rights index?
- Bolivia, Plurinational State of ranks 65th and Botswana ranks 65th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of shareholder rights index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of shareholder rights index measures the role of shareholders in key corporate decisions. It has six components: (i) whether the sale of 51% of Buyer’s assets requires shareholder approval; (ii) whether shareholders representing 10% of Buyer’s share capital have the right to call for a meeting of shareholders; (iii) whether Buyer must obtain its shareholders’ approval every time it issues new shares; (iv) whether shareholders automatically receive preemption rights when Buyer issues new shares; (v) whether shareholders elect and dismiss the external auditor; (vi) whether changes to the rights of a class of shares are only possible if the holders of the affected shares approve. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.