Kenya vs Rwanda: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time
- Kenya
- Rwanda
How they compare
Kenya currently reports 10 0-10 against 9 0-10 in Rwanda, a difference of 1 0-10.
That makes Kenya's figure about 1.1 times Rwanda's.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 15 shared years of data; in 2005 it was Rwanda ahead.
Kenya ranks 1st and Rwanda ranks 4th of 191 countries.
Rwanda has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Kenya | Rwanda | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 2 0-10 | 5.8 0-10 | 3.8 0-10 | Rwanda |
| 2010s | 4.2 0-10 | 9 0-10 | 4.8 0-10 | Rwanda |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Kenya or Rwanda?
- Kenya, at 10 0-10 against 9 0-10 in Rwanda as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Kenya and Rwanda?
- 1 0-10, with Kenya ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Kenya and Rwanda?
- 15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
- How do Kenya and Rwanda rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Kenya ranks 1st and Rwanda ranks 4th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.