Lithuania vs Mongolia: Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index over time
- Lithuania
- Mongolia
How they compare
Lithuania currently reports 7 DB15-20 methodology against 7 DB15-20 methodology in Mongolia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 7 years both countries report, Mongolia has been ahead every year.
Lithuania ranks 1st and Mongolia ranks 1st of 191 countries.
Mongolia has averaged higher in every one of the 1 decades both report.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index, Lithuania or Mongolia?
- Lithuania, at 7 DB15-20 methodology against 7 DB15-20 methodology in Mongolia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index between Lithuania and Mongolia?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Lithuania ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Lithuania and Mongolia?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Lithuania and Mongolia rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index?
- Lithuania ranks 1st and Mongolia ranks 1st of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of corporate transparency index measures the level of information that companies must share regarding their board members, senior executives, annual meetings and audits. This index has seven components: (i) whether Buyer must disclose direct and indirect beneficial ownership stakes representing 5%; (ii) whether Buyer must disclose information about board members’ primary employment and directorships in other companies; (iii) whether Buyer must disclose the compensation of individual managers; (iv) whether a detailed notice of general meeting must be sent 21 calendar days before the meeting; (v) whether shareholders representing 5% of Buyer’s share capital can put items on the general meeting agenda; (vi) whether Buyer’s annual financial statements must be audited by an external auditor; (vii) whether Buyer must disclose its audit reports to the public. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.