Belarus vs Hong Kong, China: Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index over time
- Belarus
- Hong Kong, China
How they compare
Belarus currently reports 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Hong Kong, China, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 7 years both countries report, Hong Kong, China has been ahead every year.
Belarus ranks 53rd and Hong Kong, China ranks 53rd of 191 countries.
Hong Kong, China has averaged higher in every one of the 1 decades both report.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index, Belarus or Hong Kong, China?
- Belarus, at 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Hong Kong, China as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index between Belarus and Hong Kong, China?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Belarus ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Belarus and Hong Kong, China?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Belarus and Hong Kong, China rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index?
- Belarus ranks 53rd and Hong Kong, China ranks 53rd of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of corporate transparency index measures the level of information that companies must share regarding their board members, senior executives, annual meetings and audits. This index has seven components: (i) whether Buyer must disclose direct and indirect beneficial ownership stakes representing 5%; (ii) whether Buyer must disclose information about board members’ primary employment and directorships in other companies; (iii) whether Buyer must disclose the compensation of individual managers; (iv) whether a detailed notice of general meeting must be sent 21 calendar days before the meeting; (v) whether shareholders representing 5% of Buyer’s share capital can put items on the general meeting agenda; (vi) whether Buyer’s annual financial statements must be audited by an external auditor; (vii) whether Buyer must disclose its audit reports to the public. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.