Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index in Guatemala
Guatemala: Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index was 1 DB15-20 methodology in 2019. ▬ Flat
Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index in Guatemala, 2013–2019
Source: World Bank. Measured in DB15-20 methodology.
Analysis
Guatemala recorded 1 DB15-20 methodology for protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index in 2019. That is the highest value across all 7 years on record.
Compared with earlier readings it is unchanged over ten years.
That places Guatemala 122nd out of 191 countries with data for 2019, putting it in the middle of the range.
Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index in Guatemala, year by year
| Year | DB15-20 methodology | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 1 DB15-20 methodology | — |
| 2014 | 1 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2015 | 1 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2016 | 1 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2017 | 1 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2018 | 1 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2019 | 1 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
Countries ranked near Guatemala
- 122 Barbados 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 El Salvador 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 Honduras 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 Lebanon 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 Panama 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 Puerto Rico 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 122 Palestine, State of 1 DB15-20 methodology compare
More reference data data for Guatemala
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 0.9286 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 1.39 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 3.72 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.1246 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Agricultural Soils 3.72 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 3.11 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure Management 1.9 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 7.68 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 18.61 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.6786 (2050)
Frequently asked questions
- What is protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index in Guatemala?
- Protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index in Guatemala was 1 DB15-20 methodology in 2019, according to the World Bank.
- What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index recorded in Guatemala?
- The highest recorded value was 1 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
- What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index recorded in Guatemala?
- The lowest recorded value was 1 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
- How does Guatemala rank for protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index?
- Guatemala ranks 122nd out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
- Is protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index rising or falling in Guatemala?
- Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
- Where does this Guatemala data come from?
- The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.
Download this data
CSV · JSON — 7 observations, free to reuse under CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data).
About this data
The extent of ownership and control index measures the rules governing the structure and change in control of companies. This index has seven components: (i) whether the same individual cannot be appointed CEO and chairperson of the board of directors; (ii) whether the board of directors must include independent nonexecutive board members; (iii) whether shareholder can remove members of the board of directors without cause before the end of their term; (iv) whether the board of directors must have an audit committee; (v) whether a potential acquirer must make a tender offer to all shareholders upon acquiring 50% of Buyer; (vi) whether Buyer must pay declared dividends within a maximum period set by law; (vii) whether a subsidiary cannot acquire shares issued by its parent company. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.