Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index in Chile
Chile: Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2019. ▬ Flat
Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index in Chile, 2013–2019
Source: World Bank. Measured in DB15-20 methodology.
Analysis
Chile recorded 4 DB15-20 methodology for protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index in 2019. That is the highest value across all 7 years on record.
The figure is unchanged over ten years.
Chile ranks 64th of 191 countries on this measure, in the middle of the range.
Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index in Chile, year by year
| Year | DB15-20 methodology | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 4 DB15-20 methodology | — |
| 2014 | 4 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2015 | 4 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2016 | 4 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2017 | 4 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2018 | 4 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
| 2019 | 4 DB15-20 methodology | +0.0% |
Countries ranked near Chile
- 64 Russia 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Brazil 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Antigua and Barbuda 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Bahamas 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Bulgaria 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Dominica 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Israel 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Italy 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Jamaica 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Malta 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Moldova 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Nepal 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Poland 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Portugal 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Saint Lucia 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Trinidad and Tobago 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
- 64 Tunisia 4 DB15-20 methodology compare
More reference data data for Chile
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 0.9268 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 2.22 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 5.33 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 0.2204 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Indirect emissions (N2O) - Agricultural Soils 5.33 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure applied to Soils 3.11 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure Management 1.46 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Manure left on Pasture 11.45 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - IPCC Agriculture 25.25 (2050)
- Emission Totals - Emissions (N2O) - Crop Residues 1.2 (2050)
Frequently asked questions
- What is protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index in Chile?
- Protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index in Chile was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2019, according to the World Bank.
- What is the highest protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index recorded in Chile?
- The highest recorded value was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
- What is the lowest protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index recorded in Chile?
- The lowest recorded value was 4 DB15-20 methodology in 2013.
- How does Chile rank for protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index?
- Chile ranks 64th out of 191 countries with data for 2019.
- Is protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index rising or falling in Chile?
- Over the last ten years it is unchanged. The long-run trend across the full record is flat.
- Where does this Chile data come from?
- The figures come from the World Bank, published as part of Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid updates them automatically from the source API.
Download this data
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About this data
The extent of ownership and control index measures the rules governing the structure and change in control of companies. This index has seven components: (i) whether the same individual cannot be appointed CEO and chairperson of the board of directors; (ii) whether the board of directors must include independent nonexecutive board members; (iii) whether shareholder can remove members of the board of directors without cause before the end of their term; (iv) whether the board of directors must have an audit committee; (v) whether a potential acquirer must make a tender offer to all shareholders upon acquiring 50% of Buyer; (vi) whether Buyer must pay declared dividends within a maximum period set by law; (vii) whether a subsidiary cannot acquire shares issued by its parent company. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.