Panama vs Samoa: Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6)
Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) over time
- Panama
- Samoa
How they compare
Panama currently reports 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Samoa, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Samoa has been ahead every year.
Panama ranks 130th and Samoa ranks 130th of 191 countries.
Samoa has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Panama | Samoa | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 2 DB15-20 methodology | 3 DB15-20 methodology | 1 DB15-20 methodology | Samoa |
| 2010s | 2.3 DB15-20 methodology | 3 DB15-20 methodology | 0.7 DB15-20 methodology | Samoa |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6), Panama or Samoa?
- Panama, at 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Samoa as of 2019.
- What is the difference in resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6) between Panama and Samoa?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Panama ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Panama and Samoa?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Panama and Samoa rank globally for resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6)?
- Panama ranks 130th and Samoa ranks 130th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The management of debtor's assets index has six components: (i) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can continue performing contracts essential to the debtor’s survival; (ii) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can reject overly burdensome contracts; (iii) whether undervalued transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (iv) whether transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings that give preference to one or several creditors can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (v) whether the insolvency framework includes specific provisions that allow the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf), after commencement of insolvency proceedings, to obtain financing necessary to function during the proceedings; and (vi) whether post-commencement finance receives priority over ordinary unsecured creditors during distribution of assets.