Malawi vs Nepal: Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6)
Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) over time
- Malawi
- Nepal
How they compare
Malawi currently reports 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Nepal, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 17 shared years of data; in 2003 it was Malawi ahead.
Malawi ranks 97th and Nepal ranks 97th of 191 countries.
Nepal has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Malawi | Nepal | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 2 DB15-20 methodology | 2.57 DB15-20 methodology | 0.5714 DB15-20 methodology | Nepal |
| 2010s | 2.6 DB15-20 methodology | 4 DB15-20 methodology | 1.4 DB15-20 methodology | Nepal |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6), Malawi or Nepal?
- Malawi, at 4 DB15-20 methodology against 4 DB15-20 methodology in Nepal as of 2019.
- What is the difference in resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6) between Malawi and Nepal?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Malawi ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Malawi and Nepal?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do Malawi and Nepal rank globally for resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6)?
- Malawi ranks 97th and Nepal ranks 97th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The management of debtor's assets index has six components: (i) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can continue performing contracts essential to the debtor’s survival; (ii) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can reject overly burdensome contracts; (iii) whether undervalued transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (iv) whether transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings that give preference to one or several creditors can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (v) whether the insolvency framework includes specific provisions that allow the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf), after commencement of insolvency proceedings, to obtain financing necessary to function during the proceedings; and (vi) whether post-commencement finance receives priority over ordinary unsecured creditors during distribution of assets.