France vs Japan: Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6)
Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) over time
- France
- Japan
How they compare
France currently reports 6 DB15-20 methodology against 6 DB15-20 methodology in Japan, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 17 years both countries report, Japan has been ahead every year.
France ranks 1st and Japan ranks 1st of 191 countries.
Japan has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | France | Japan | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 5.14 DB15-20 methodology | 6 DB15-20 methodology | 0.8571 DB15-20 methodology | Japan |
| 2010s | 6 DB15-20 methodology | 6 DB15-20 methodology | 0 DB15-20 methodology | — |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6), France or Japan?
- France, at 6 DB15-20 methodology against 6 DB15-20 methodology in Japan as of 2019.
- What is the difference in resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6) between France and Japan?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with France ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for France and Japan?
- 17 years are reported by both, from 2003 to 2019.
- How do France and Japan rank globally for resolving insolvency: management of debtor's assets index (0-6)?
- France ranks 1st and Japan ranks 1st of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Resolving insolvency: Management of debtor's assets index (0-6) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The management of debtor's assets index has six components: (i) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can continue performing contracts essential to the debtor’s survival; (ii) whether the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf) can reject overly burdensome contracts; (iii) whether undervalued transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (iv) whether transactions entered into before commencement of insolvency proceedings that give preference to one or several creditors can be avoided after proceedings are initiated; (v) whether the insolvency framework includes specific provisions that allow the debtor (or an insolvency representative on its behalf), after commencement of insolvency proceedings, to obtain financing necessary to function during the proceedings; and (vi) whether post-commencement finance receives priority over ordinary unsecured creditors during distribution of assets.