Iran, Islamic Republic of vs Namibia: Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index over time
- Iran, Islamic Republic of
- Namibia
How they compare
Iran, Islamic Republic of currently reports 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Namibia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 7 years both countries report, Namibia has been ahead every year.
Iran, Islamic Republic of ranks 84th and Namibia ranks 84th of 191 countries.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index, Iran, Islamic Republic of or Namibia?
- Iran, Islamic Republic of, at 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Namibia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index between Iran, Islamic Republic of and Namibia?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Iran, Islamic Republic of ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Iran, Islamic Republic of and Namibia?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Iran, Islamic Republic of and Namibia rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index?
- Iran, Islamic Republic of ranks 84th and Namibia ranks 84th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of ownership and control index measures the rules governing the structure and change in control of companies. This index has seven components: (i) whether the same individual cannot be appointed CEO and chairperson of the board of directors; (ii) whether the board of directors must include independent nonexecutive board members; (iii) whether shareholder can remove members of the board of directors without cause before the end of their term; (iv) whether the board of directors must have an audit committee; (v) whether a potential acquirer must make a tender offer to all shareholders upon acquiring 50% of Buyer; (vi) whether Buyer must pay declared dividends within a maximum period set by law; (vii) whether a subsidiary cannot acquire shares issued by its parent company. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.