Hong Kong, China vs Morocco: Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index over time
- Hong Kong, China
- Morocco
How they compare
Hong Kong, China currently reports 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Morocco, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 7 shared years of data; in 2013 it was Hong Kong, China ahead.
Hong Kong, China ranks 35th and Morocco ranks 35th of 191 countries.
Hong Kong, China has averaged higher in every one of the 1 decades both report.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index, Hong Kong, China or Morocco?
- Hong Kong, China, at 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Morocco as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index between Hong Kong, China and Morocco?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Hong Kong, China ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Hong Kong, China and Morocco?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Hong Kong, China and Morocco rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index?
- Hong Kong, China ranks 35th and Morocco ranks 35th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of ownership and control index measures the rules governing the structure and change in control of companies. This index has seven components: (i) whether the same individual cannot be appointed CEO and chairperson of the board of directors; (ii) whether the board of directors must include independent nonexecutive board members; (iii) whether shareholder can remove members of the board of directors without cause before the end of their term; (iv) whether the board of directors must have an audit committee; (v) whether a potential acquirer must make a tender offer to all shareholders upon acquiring 50% of Buyer; (vi) whether Buyer must pay declared dividends within a maximum period set by law; (vii) whether a subsidiary cannot acquire shares issued by its parent company. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.