Bosnia and Herzegovina vs Latvia: Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index over time
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Latvia
How they compare
Bosnia and Herzegovina currently reports 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Latvia, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
Across all 7 years both countries report, Latvia has been ahead every year.
Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 35th and Latvia ranks 35th of 191 countries.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Latvia?
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, at 5 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Latvia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Bosnia and Herzegovina ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of ownership and control index?
- Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 35th and Latvia ranks 35th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of ownership and control index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of ownership and control index measures the rules governing the structure and change in control of companies. This index has seven components: (i) whether the same individual cannot be appointed CEO and chairperson of the board of directors; (ii) whether the board of directors must include independent nonexecutive board members; (iii) whether shareholder can remove members of the board of directors without cause before the end of their term; (iv) whether the board of directors must have an audit committee; (v) whether a potential acquirer must make a tender offer to all shareholders upon acquiring 50% of Buyer; (vi) whether Buyer must pay declared dividends within a maximum period set by law; (vii) whether a subsidiary cannot acquire shares issued by its parent company. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.