Rwanda vs Saudi Arabia: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time
- Rwanda
- Saudi Arabia
How they compare
Rwanda currently reports 9 0-10 against 9 0-10 in Saudi Arabia, a difference of 0 0-10.
The two have swapped places 2 times across 15 shared years of data; in 2005 it was Saudi Arabia ahead.
Rwanda ranks 4th and Saudi Arabia ranks 4th of 191 countries.
Across the 2 decades both report, Rwanda averaged higher in 1 and Saudi Arabia in 1.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Rwanda | Saudi Arabia | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 5.8 0-10 | 7.4 0-10 | 1.6 0-10 | Saudi Arabia |
| 2010s | 9 0-10 | 8.2 0-10 | 0.8 0-10 | Rwanda |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Rwanda or Saudi Arabia?
- Rwanda, at 9 0-10 against 9 0-10 in Saudi Arabia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Rwanda and Saudi Arabia?
- 0 0-10, with Rwanda ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Rwanda and Saudi Arabia?
- 15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
- How do Rwanda and Saudi Arabia rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Rwanda ranks 4th and Saudi Arabia ranks 4th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.