Lesotho vs Republic of Moldova: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time
- Lesotho
- Republic of Moldova
How they compare
Lesotho currently reports 4 0-10 against 4 0-10 in Republic of Moldova, a difference of 0 0-10.
Across all 15 years both countries report, Republic of Moldova has been ahead every year.
Lesotho ranks 108th and Republic of Moldova ranks 108th of 191 countries.
Republic of Moldova has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Lesotho | Republic of Moldova | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 1 0-10 | 2 0-10 | 1 0-10 | Republic of Moldova |
| 2010s | 3.4 0-10 | 3.6 0-10 | 0.2 0-10 | Republic of Moldova |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Lesotho or Republic of Moldova?
- Lesotho, at 4 0-10 against 4 0-10 in Republic of Moldova as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Lesotho and Republic of Moldova?
- 0 0-10, with Lesotho ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Lesotho and Republic of Moldova?
- 15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
- How do Lesotho and Republic of Moldova rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Lesotho ranks 108th and Republic of Moldova ranks 108th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.