Iran, Islamic Republic of vs Lithuania: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time
- Iran, Islamic Republic of
- Lithuania
How they compare
Iran, Islamic Republic of currently reports 4 0-10 against 4 0-10 in Lithuania, a difference of 0 0-10.
Across all 15 years both countries report, Lithuania has been ahead every year.
Iran, Islamic Republic of ranks 108th and Lithuania ranks 108th of 191 countries.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Iran, Islamic Republic of | Lithuania | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 4 0-10 | 4 0-10 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2010s | 4 0-10 | 4 0-10 | 0 0-10 | — |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Iran, Islamic Republic of or Lithuania?
- Iran, Islamic Republic of, at 4 0-10 against 4 0-10 in Lithuania as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Iran, Islamic Republic of and Lithuania?
- 0 0-10, with Iran, Islamic Republic of ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Iran, Islamic Republic of and Lithuania?
- 15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
- How do Iran, Islamic Republic of and Lithuania rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Iran, Islamic Republic of ranks 108th and Lithuania ranks 108th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.