Hong Kong, China vs Saint Lucia: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time
- Hong Kong, China
- Saint Lucia
How they compare
Hong Kong, China currently reports 8 0-10 against 8 0-10 in Saint Lucia, a difference of 0 0-10.
Across all 15 years both countries report, Saint Lucia has been ahead every year.
Hong Kong, China ranks 16th and Saint Lucia ranks 16th of 191 countries.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Hong Kong, China | Saint Lucia | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 8 0-10 | 8 0-10 | 0 0-10 | — |
| 2010s | 8 0-10 | 8 0-10 | 0 0-10 | — |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Hong Kong, China or Saint Lucia?
- Hong Kong, China, at 8 0-10 against 8 0-10 in Saint Lucia as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Hong Kong, China and Saint Lucia?
- 0 0-10, with Hong Kong, China ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Hong Kong, China and Saint Lucia?
- 15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
- How do Hong Kong, China and Saint Lucia rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Hong Kong, China ranks 16th and Saint Lucia ranks 16th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.