Democratic Republic of Congo vs Niger: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- Niger
How they compare
Democratic Republic of Congo currently reports 1 0-10 against 1 0-10 in Niger, a difference of 0 0-10.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 15 shared years of data; in 2005 it was Democratic Republic of Congo ahead.
Democratic Republic of Congo ranks 157th and Niger ranks 157th of 191 countries.
Democratic Republic of Congo has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.
Head to head by decade
| Decade | Democratic Republic of Congo | Niger | Difference | Ahead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s | 3 0-10 | 1 0-10 | 2 0-10 | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| 2010s | 1.6 0-10 | 1 0-10 | 0.6 0-10 | Democratic Republic of Congo |
Averages of every year both report within each decade.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Democratic Republic of Congo or Niger?
- Democratic Republic of Congo, at 1 0-10 against 1 0-10 in Niger as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger?
- 0 0-10, with Democratic Republic of Congo ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger?
- 15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
- How do Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
- Democratic Republic of Congo ranks 157th and Niger ranks 157th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.